To accomplish the mission of providing for the defense of Dien Khanh district and for the western defense of the city of Nha Trang, Detachment A-502 (Det A-502) conducted various combat and intelligence gathering operations. The reconnaissance patrolling tactics and techniques employed by U. S. Special Forces in Vietnam came from the British Special Air Service (SAS) experiences gained during counter-insurgency operations that were successfully employed by the SAS when they fought against the communists insurgents in Malaysia 1956-1960. Patrolling, raids, and ambushes, as a guerrilla, became a key component of the Unconventional Warfare training taught to U. S. Special Forces at FT Bragg, N. C. Those jungle fighting and patrolling skills were reinforced by the combat lessons learned from U.S. Special Forces soldiers fighting the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) in the jungles, mountains, and swamps of Vietnam. With the major buildup of conventional U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1966, General Westmoreland tasked the 5th Special Forces Group to establish an in country “RECONDO” school to train U. S. Army soldiers how to conduct Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) deep into enemy occupied territory. The fearless all volunteer U.S. students under went a physically and mentally grueling 18-hour per day, 3 weeks of combat reconnaisance patrol training. The RECONDO training program culminated with a 4 to 5 day live fire, in-in-the-field, combat patrol against VC/NVA enemy forces on the Grand Summit mountain and in the always-dangerous jungle mountains in the operational area of Det A-502.

    Of the five 132 man CIDG Companies at Camp Trung Dung, two were ethnic Vietnamese. The other three companies were ethnically from several Montagnard tribes. They joined the CIDG program to serve as close to their homes as possible. When in camp three hot meals and clean barracks were provided. To be drafted into the Vietnamese Army and meant fighting, dying, and be buried away from their ancestors. The professional reputation and the respect of the CIDG from U. S. Special Forces also significantly helped the recruiting and retention of the CIDG. In a firefight the CIDG could count on us to be fighting right along side them. And if they were wounded we would get them to an excellent hospital run by the U. S. Special Forces medics…not to the notoriously bad Vietnamese Army hospital. Each month I would prepare the payroll and the U. S. Special Forces sergeants assigned to each of the CIDG companies, as advisors would pay them. If a CIDG soldier were killed, we would also make sure that his survivors got six-month pay cash payment.

    The Long Range Combat patrols from Det A-502 were of 5 to 10 days long and were conducted into the enemy controlled jungle -mountains of the Dien Khanh District’s Song Cai River Valley. Covered in triple canopy jungle growth, these extremely rugged mountains rapidly rose from sea level to 3000 to 4000 feet and surrounded the valley on three sides...in a U shape. The Det A-502 combat patrols consisted of the 40 man Recon Platoon, or a 132 man CIDG Company, or a 132 man CIDG Company with the Recon Platoon scouting ahead at the front. Usually at least two U.S. Special Forces advisors, two Vietnamese (VN) Special Forces, and an interpreter would accompany the CIDG forces. The CIDG, although small in height, were as strong as mountain goats and were very familiar with operating in the jungles. The indigenous Montagnards were especially at home in their native jungle environment. In addition, the CIDG welcomed the extra combat pay they received for each day on patrol. Although essential, these patrols were not without cost in that many of the CIDG returned with Malaria and would be a long time recovering.

    Combat Patrols usually were organized and planned at Det A-502 Camp Trung Dung HQ. Patrols would depart the camp in the late afternoon and spend the night in a local village at the edge of the jungle, then slip into the jungle just before dawn. In so doing, most of the perfume aromas of soap, shaving cream, and other smells that can carry in the jungle air and give away your presence would be eliminated. For the duration of the patrol, no one would bath or shave. Nor did we talk out loud…only in whispers or hand signals, and only when essential. All human sounds and smells are unusual in the jungle and can carry big distances revealing your positions. Accordingly, we wore no flak jackets, steel helmets, or exposed metal that would sound off when a branch snaps back and hits you. Even our dog tags were taped together. The pace of march was deliberately slow to avoid scarring animals away. The jungle is in fact very noisy and is filled with sounds of birds, monkeys and other animals calling out as well as the natural sounds of tree limbs braking off or water trickling. The scariest sound in the jungle is silence! When you hear it get quiet…danger awaits.

    In that the size of American uniforms and battle gear were too large for the Vietnamese, the U.S. Special Forces were authorized special procurement funds to obtain mission essentials supplies for the CIDG program. The 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa provided logistical support for the 5th Special Forces in Vietnam. The 1st Group ordered and supplied the famous “Tiger Strip Fatigues” and Bata boots (sneakers) made in Korea especially for the CIDG. Because of the elite status of U.S. Special Forces soldiers who also wore the Tiger Fatigues, other U.S. forces converted these distinctive fatigues and wore them on their long-range patrols. A small size rucksack was also manufactured and procured for the CIDG. “C-Rations” from the U.S. Army was also not suitable for CIDG. To satisfy the taste of the CIDG, canned meats and candies from Sweden were used to supplement the baseball sized cooked rice balls that the CIDG carried on patrol, along with small dried fish heads and the salty foul smelling (but delicious) fish sauce…”Nuc Mum”.